Yes, the Mumbai outrage was caused by Lashkar fighters motivated by an Islamist ideology. But it is an ideology which serves the strategic needs of a nuclear state called Pakistan. Indeed, it was not only timed to serve the interests of that nuclear power but has done so most successfully. Fareed Zakaria explained the strategy in a question he put to Henry Kissinger:

 

ZAKARIA: When I have talked to some Pakistani military people, privately they will say to me, “Look, the problem is you Americans. One day you will leave, and we will be left in the neighborhood. And here is what the neighborhood looks like to us — an India that will dominate us, an Afghanistan that would be allied with India and allied with Russia. So, we have to maintain some options.”In other words, there is a basic geopolitical sense that having an unstable Afghanistan may help Pakistan, having some ability to destabilize India cheaply through the use of jihadis benefits Pakistan.

Can we — can the United States really change that strategic conception in Pakistan?

It is interesting that to make the Pakistani case more compelling, Zakaria leaves China out of the geostrategic equation. After all, if their alliance with China is added to the equation, Pakistan does not look all that vulnerable to Indian encirclement. Nor does a heightened American role in the region seem so essential.

 

KISSINGER: It cannot change that perception in a week or two, or a month or two.A prerequisite for any successful policy in the region is to contribute to the conviction, and bring about the conviction, that we are not going to withdraw from the region. We may withdraw troops from this or that place for tactical reasons, but that we will remain a major factor in the region for our own self-interest, because the radicalization of the whole region would ultimately threaten American security and wellbeing.

Secondly, to keep Afghanistan in turmoil and India under constant threat will, in the long run, destroy Pakistan’s security.

The notion that India’s only foreign policy is the destruction of Pakistan — which might have had some foundations in the early years of the independence — will not be relevant really in the role that India will be playing on the global scene. And it cannot be in the Indian interest to add more disaffected Muslims to its own area of control.

So that I could imagine — and I had the impression on my visit to India — that, were it not for this incident, a discussion of a long-term, constructive relationship between India and Pakistan is possible. And the United States could contribute to that in a significant way.

The problem will be how to manage the next three to six months without their getting out of control, because one could imagine that the idea will arise in India that they must take very drastic measures to prevent the repetition of recent events.

Nothing can play more into the hands of the Pakistani military hot heads than an American/international commitment to strangle India with loving kindness, i.e., prevent yet again an Indian response. The Pakistani PM (Mr. 10%) may be an easily rattled novice who is naive enough to think that India needs to be appeased, but experienced hands quickly set him straight so publicly that even the NYT editors noticed:

 

Unfortunately, the offer was quickly withdrawn after the Pakistani Army and opposition parties objected. The government then announced that a lower-level intelligence official would go at some point. By Saturday, Pakistani officials were blustering as if they were the victims. Despite all of the recent horrors Pakistan has suffered, its military and intelligence services still do not understand that the terrorists pose a mortal threat to their own country.

Why should they not be blustering?! As they had expected, Indians are more angry with their admittedly incompetent security services than with the terrorists or the hostile neighbor which continues to activate them. The Indian government is more focused on retaining power than protecting the country. The world is determined to prevent India from “over reacting” i.e., attacking the camps where the terrorists were trained and their deadly plans were hatched.

Last but not least, the attack has achieved it’s main strategic objective, it refocused attention on Kashmir. Pakistan has always wanted to internationalize the issue of Kashmir. India objected. To India’s chagrin, Barack Obama’s men have talked about paying for Pakistani cooperation in Afghanistan with Indian carrots (Kashmir). The attack on Mumbai by Lashkar E Taiba was timed to help Obama sell the program to India and the world. It has done so brilliantly. A week ago, Kashmir was on the back burner. The terrorist moved her to the front. NYT editors conclude:

 

Washington’s most important role will be to urge the Indians and Pakistanis to step back from the brink. The next administration will then have to move quickly to encourage serious negotiations over the future of Kashmir and genuine cooperation to defeat extremists.

Sorry, such a policy is not going to defeat the extremists. It is going to hand them an easy victory.

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