Gideon Rachman doubts the validity of the NIE and exposes The myth of a bargain with Iran and concludes:

 

For years, those who have opposed the drive to war have urged America to strike a “grand bargain” with Iran. This would involve Iran forswearing nuclear weapons in a convincing and verifiable way and generally promising to behave better in the region. In return Iran would get full diplomatic recognition from the US, the lifting of sanctions (such as they are) and all manner of economic and technological benefits.But there are two obvious snags. First, America’s intelligence re-assessment will probably be a boon to hardliners in Tehran. President Mahmoud Ahmadi-Nejad will be able to say that Iran has stood firm and faced down the world. In such a climate, why should the Iranians make concessions?

Second, there may be no “grand bargain” to be had. Most of the evidence suggests that the determination to get a nuclear bomb is a national project in Iran – uniting different political factions. The Iranians are not necessarily in a hurry. They might be deterred for a while. But the nuclear programme has become a symbol of national machismo – and is also widely regarded as a strategic necessity, given that Iran is surrounded by hostile powers.

Iran also has ambitions in the region. It is the biggest country in the Gulf area – or, as the Iranians insist on calling it, the Persian Gulf area – and it wants its “natural role” to be recognised. If Iran is to be the regional hegemon, then the US military presence must be greatly diminished. The US army is in Iraq, the navy is in Bahrain, the air force is in Qatar. There is no way that the Americans are going to cede the dominant security role in the Gulf – a region that sits on top of 60 per cent of the world’s known oil reserves and 40 per cent of its natural gas.

That is the basic reason why a grand bargain will be so hard to achieve. The US and the Iranians are strategic rivals in the Gulf region. They are not going to become friends. The best that can be hoped for is an uneasy modus vivendi.

As for the Iranian nuclear programme: the message that the American public risks being left with is that it would be impossible to live with an Iranian bomb – but fortunately Iran is no longer pursuing nuclear weapons. The reality is the complete opposite. Iran probably will get nuclear weapons. And the west will probably have to learn to live with it.

Rachman speculated that the intelligence community estimate was a bid to reassert its independence. If so, it is doing it at a very high cost. Every mistake it has ever made is bound to be exposed and their were plenty. Today, Brett Stephens reminds his readers of a 1962 one:

 

“The USSR could derive considerable military advantage from the establishment of Soviet medium- and intermediate-range ballistic missiles in Cuba, or from the establishment of a submarine base there. . . . Either development, however, would be incompatible with Soviet practice to date and with Soviet policy as we presently estimate it.”–Special National Intelligence Estimate 85-3-62, Sept. 19, 1962

Yes, you guessed it. The Cuban missile crisis exploded not a month later:

 

Twenty-five days after this NIE was published, a U-2 spy plane photographed a Soviet ballistic missile site in Cuba, and the Cuban Missile Crisis began. It’s possible the latest NIE on Iran’s nuclear weapons program will not prove as misjudged or as damaging as the 1962 estimate. But don’t bet on it.At the heart of last week’s NIE is the “high confidence” judgment that Tehran “halted its nuclear weapons program” in the fall of 2003, “primarily in response to increasing international scrutiny and pressure resulting from exposure of Iran’s previously undeclared nuclear work.” Prior to that, however, the NIE states, also with “high confidence,” that “Iranian military entities were working under government direction to develop nuclear weapons.” Left to a footnote is the explanation that “by ‘nuclear weapons program’ we mean Iran’s nuclear weapon design and weaponization work. . . . we do not mean Iran’s declared civil work related to uranium conversion and enrichment.”

Let’s unpack this.

In August 2002, an Iranian opposition group revealed that Iran had an undeclared uranium enrichment facility at Natanz and an undeclared heavy water facility at Arak–both previously unknown to the pros of the U.S. intelligence community. Since then, the administration has labored to persuade the international community that all these facilities have no conceivable purpose other than a military one. Those efforts paid off in three successive U.N. Security Council resolutions demanding Iran suspend enrichment because it was “concerned by the proliferation risks” it posed.

Along comes the NIE to instantly undo four years of diplomacy, using a semantic sleight-of-hand to suggest some kind of distinction can be drawn between Iran’s bid to master the nuclear fuel cycle and its efforts to build nuclear weapons. How credible is this distinction?

Do read the rest.

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