Comments on the fight between Fatah al Islam and the Lebanese Army in Northern Lebanon.

Lebanon’s “Brave Little Force”

W. Thomas Smith Jr. National Review Online.

Again, checked in with Dr. Walid Phares.

As many of you may know, Walid is an expert on international terrorism, who has frequently testified before Congress and conducted both congressional and State Department briefings on issues related to terrorism, the Middle East, and Asia. He’s also a native of Lebanon who, prior to his relocating to the United States in 1990, was a practicing attorney and law professor in Beirut.

Walid and I have worked together on numerous projects in the past, and we’ve spoken frequently since the fighting erupted in Lebanon’s northern city of Tripoli.

This morning, my question to him was simple: Based on what we’ve seen thus far, the 15,000-man Lebanese Army appears to be performing pretty well. Don’t you think?

His response:

Yes, it is a brave little force.

In fact just today, my sources there in Lebanon and here in the U.S., have told me that tactically, the operations conducted by the units of the Lebanese Army [LA] have so far been successful against the al Qaeda-affiliated elements in Tripoli.

The combined operations by the LA included an advance by infantry and special forces, supported by Tanks, taking back most of the positions captured the day before by the Jihadists of Fatah al Islam. The Lebanese troops reached the entrances to the Nahr al bared Palestinian camp and secured the roads leading to the agglomeration.

Meanwhile, the armor continued pounding the enemy sniper positions, while other LA units were patrolling areas inside Tripoli, searching for arms.

Indeed, according to the sources, caches of weapons were found in different neighborhoods. The city’s citizens were said to have led the soldiers to the locations. So, in short, this little Army — barely equipped with M113 armored personnel carriers, Humvees, and few old M48 tanks — has been able to roll back an al Qaeda-type militia into its compounds inside the camp, where the Lebanese troops cannot go, so far.

This alone demonstrates that a well-trained and determined local force can take on the terrorists, including al Qaeda. The Jihadists have a weak spot when confronted by indigenous but “determined” forces. It is a lesson for the whole strategy in the War on Terror, and also for the conflict in Iraq.

.

However, the limited tactical success of Lebanese forces in Tripoli can be reversed if a strategic decision is not taken by the U.S., the international community and also by the Lebanese Government. For Fatah al Islam is not entrenched inside the camp. And going after terrorists inside a civilian agglomeration is strategically challenging. Al Qaeda’s affiliate in Lebanon could transform Nahr al bared into a local ‘Fallujah,’ which means that it would require a decision by the Seniora government to cross the barrier. It will request also international assistance. Because if the Lebanese Army is ordered to move in, the other Jihadist organizations in Sidon, the Bekaa and in Beirut will attack the Lebanese military simultaneously.

.

Besides, the Syrians could also order their militias into battle and Iran could order Hezbollah in. The Lebanese Army, poorly equipped, not endowed with a command structure that can coordinate with the government and not fully committed to the counterterror war yet, may be broken into smaller pieces.

So far, the battle against Fatah al Islam has shown that Lebanese soldiers can defeat al Qaeda Jihadists in a street fight, but only if they are supported by their government and eventually the international community. But if there is not strategic decision in Beirut, and ultimately in Washington and Brussels to lend real support to this brave little force, the Jihadists will counterattack, and overrun the government.

Armed elements, allied to Fatah al Islam, have already positioned themselves within the Palestinian camps of Sidon and Miyeh-Miyeh.

The next 48 hours are important.

* * *

Fighting in Lebanon - Phares with the Latest Analysis

W. Thomas Smith Jr.

Walid Phares with more analysis exclusive to The Tank:

The Grand Syro-Iranian spring offensive has begun in Lebanon. The design is to drag the Lebanese Army into side - but costly - fights with group A, while group B is preparing itself for the next stage, possibly a summer offensive.

There is a consensus among terrorism analysts in Lebanon — including those within the Lebanese Government and the Cedars Revolution – that elements within Syrian intelligence have been tasked with instigating or initiating a battle in Tripoli between Fatah al Islam and the Lebanese Army in hopes that Lebanese Army units would falter and Lebanese-Palestinian fighting would widen.

Fatah al Islam-al Qaeda Lebanese Army Hezbollah

The second stage of this spring offensive is to push elements of Jund al Sham (another al Qaeda affiliate) into the southern Palestinian camp of Miyeh-Miyeh near Sidon. The objective is to open another front for Group A: that is the Salafists against the same Lebanese Armed Forces.
.
Ultimately, the Syro-Iranians hope to see the Lebanese armed forces engaged in fighting in multiple enclaves from Tripoli to Sidon, and perhaps to the Bekaa.
.
This terror plan is to drain the operational forces of the Lebanese Army by forcing the LA to engage enemy forces in multiple locations.
.
Such a situation would quickly deplete the munitions of regular forces and dangerously stretch Lebanese forces.
.
Aware that 10,000 soldiers of the Lebanese armed forces are already deployed south of the Litani in order to implement UN resolution 1701 along with UNIFIL forces [United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon], the joint Syrian-Hezbollah war room has in fact pushed the Salafist Jihadists toward the objective of spreading and dividing Lebanese forces across the Lebanese territories. The long-term objective is to “kill” the central force of the Lebanese Army and prevent it from being reinforced by its own reserve forces.
.
By early summer, Group B — composed of Hezbollah and all other pro-Syrian militias would join the fray against the Lebanese government and seize ground in Beirut and throughout the remainder of the country.
.
Hence, the Lebanese Army confrontation with al Qaeda in Tripoli — and eventually in Sidon — should take into consideration Group B preparing for future action.

Besides, when it comes to Hezbollah, many LA soldiers who are under the influence of (or who fear) the Iranian-backed militia might quit.
.
So, what we see right now, is a Lebanese Army engaging the northern front with al Qaeda. The Lebanese soldiers have very little equipment, and the may possibly have to engage the Bin Laden elements in the south, soon.
.
In our estimation, the international community (including the U.S.) must have an emergency plan for strategic assistance of the Lebanese government against Group A now. And it must expect attacks from Group B in the very near future.
.
Yes, the Lebanese troops, with their M16 rifles, M113 troop transports, and outdated M48 tanks, are showing courage against the most lethal terrorists on the face of the earth. But courage alone is not enough.
.
Washington must act fast to enable the Lebanese Government to achieve the following:

• Contain the terrorists in the Tripoli area.
• Contain the terrorists in the Miyeh-Miyeh area.
• Regroup central LA forces to protect the government and the Cedars Revolution from a potential summer offensive by Hezbollah
• Integrate an international plan under UNSCR 1559 and 1701 to disarm the militias and defend the borders against Syria.

Have PoliticalMavens.com delivered to your inbox in a daily digest by clicking here