The Iraq Study Group has handed down its findings and policy solutions for Iraq. Depending on what you read or where you watch, the media tell us it is a repudiation of the Bush Doctrine, a cover story for a graceful exit, a helping hand from father (George H.W. Bush) to son (George W. Bush), a surrender, a template for bridging America’s divisions, a “realist manifesto.” But more than anything else, it is a statement of the obvious.

Perhaps that is to be expected, given James Baker and Lee Hamilton’s desire to produce a consensus document. When the goal is consensus, the result is usually the lowest common denominator. Hence, the commission enlightens us with such insights as the following:

-The United States should launch a comprehensive diplomatic offensive to deal with the problems of Iraq and of the region. (I lost count of US diplomatic offensives sometime earlier this year, after all the “last-ditch diplomatic” pushes of the late 1990s, 2002, 2003, 2004 and 2005.)
 
-Citing a “grave and deteriorating” situation in Iraq, the commission warns that “neighboring countries could intervene.” A day before the formal release of the report, former commission member Robert Gates, who is the next secretary of defense, warned of the prospect of a “regional conflagration.” (Could intervene? Iran and Syria already have. And as to this notion that we are on the brink of a regional conflagration, we are far beyond the brink.)
 
-The United States should provide additional political, economic, and military support for Afghanistan. (In this, the commission implicitly and perhaps unwittingly concedes what many of us have said since 9/11—that Iraq and Afghanistan are both fronts in a much wider war.)
 
-The U.S. should “remain in close and frequent contact with the Iraqi leadership.” (Between the U.S. president, U.S. Congressional delegations, U.S. secretaries of state and defense, U.S. generals and U.S. ambassadors, and, of course, U.S. commissions, I would guess that Malaki and his predecessors have plenty of contact with the United States government.)
 
-The U.S. should “expand and upgrade communications equipment and motor vehicles for the Iraqi Police Service…[and] urge the Iraqi government to post all oil contracts, volumes, and prices on the Web.” (This is not exactly the sort of grand, sweeping, Marshall-esque vision of the way forward we were promised.)
 
When the commission strays from the obvious or the minutia, it drifts into difficult, if not dangerous, terrain. For example, the commission calls on the United States to “engage directly with Iran and Syria in order to try to obtain their commitment to constructive policies toward Iraq and other regional issues.”
 
Iran and Syria are pumping men, material and money into Iraq to destabilize it and to blunt Washington’s stated goal of spreading democracy across the Middle East. They have fomented wars in Lebanon and Iraq. Indeed, the Iranians and Syrians are waging a regional war by proxy—and they are not paying any price for it. They are terrorist regimes that are in open violation of international norms and U.S. goals.

The panel also urges Washington to talk with Moqtada al-Sadr and other militia and insurgent leaders. Sadr is responsible for American deaths. He should have been killed or captured in 2004, when Iraqi officials charged him with murder.

In short, with due respect to the well-meaning wise men on the commission, there are glaring flaws with the Iraq Study Group, not the least of which is something beyond its control—something for which Congress is to blamed:  Commissions like this short-circuit or bypass altogether what the Founders envisioned for our system of government.

The American people did not elect a commission-in-chief to define and conduct foreign policy, command the armed forces or point the way forward in Iraq. That is the president’s job. This commission was not empowered to make law, declare war or victory or defeat, make peace, or check the Executive branch. That is the job of Congress—and it is a job Congress is increasingly unwilling or unable to perform.

Creating a commission is no substitute for action, just as stating the obvious is no substitute for policy.  

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